

NO VOTER TO BE LEFT BEHIND

Welcome to the Learning Module for S.P.

Session 4

Criticality Assessment of PS

# Learning Objectives of the Module

<b>Sr. No.</b>	<b>Learning Objective</b>	<b>Sr. No.</b>	<b>Sub-learning Objective</b>
4	To be able to explain the procedure for carrying out criticality mapping of PS	4.1	To be able to enlist the factors for identifying the critical PS
		4.2	To be able to enlist the measures to be taken for identified critical PSs



## Sub Learning Objective 1

To be able to explain the  
important considerations for criticality assessment of PS

(ECI Instruction No. 464/INST/2008-EPS dt. 24.10.2008)

# Legal Provisions

- Undue influence in elections is an electoral offence u/s. 171C of the IPC.
- Any voluntary interference or attempt at interfering with the free exercise of any electoral right constitutes the crime of undue influence in an election.
- Any direct or indirect interference or attempt to interfere on the part of the candidate or his agent, or of any other person with the consent of the candidate or his election agent with the free exercise of any electoral right is a corrupt practice (Sec. 123(2) of R P Act, 1951)


# Why this exercise?

- To take due cognizance of the role of muscle power in the elections.
- To curb the menace of threat and intimidation of voters especially the weaker sections of society at elections.
- To ensure that everybody is allowed to cast their vote without fear or threat.

# DEO/RO to identify critical polling stations

## Parameters for identification of critical PSs

NO VOTER TO BE LEFT BEHIND



### PSs of high % of non EPIC voters

An analysis of the polling station wise number of voters with EPIC and without EPIC (non EPIC voters) shall be made. The polling stations shall be sorted in descending order in terms of number of non-EPIC voters in order to prioritize.

# Parameters for identification of critical PSs

NO VOTER TO BE LEFT BEHIND



## **PSs of high % of missing voters without family links**

For this purpose the total number of such missing voters without family linkage shall be divided by the total number of polling stations to work out the assembly constituency average. Analysing the deviation above the average, will help to identify the polling stations with large number of such voters.

# Parameters for identification of critical PSs



**PS having vulnerable pockets- SO's, Police's and candidate's "worry list"**

- During the election the DEOs/ROs may be asked to do a vulnerability mapping of hamlets/villages/electoral segments, vulnerable for threat and intimidation. Polling stations identified as having vulnerable pockets shall be listed.



**PS where polling was more than 90% & where more than 75% of votes have been recorded in favor of one candidate in last election**

- The polling station wise election results available in Form 20 with reference to the past general election shall be analysed and shall be identified as critical PS



## Parameters for identification of critical PSs



**PS where Re-poll reported due to malpractices & where electoral violence has taken place during last election shall be identified**

# Other Parameters

- ❑ The criteria which shall also be considered in identifying the criticality of Polling Stations are as follows:-
  - Past history such as incidents of Booth Capturing, violence, riots, large-scale impersonation, caste conflicts etc. at the Polling Station area of the constituency.
  - Information regarding abnormal law & order situation in any particular area.
  - Worry list made available by political parties and candidates
  - Number of history-sheeters and absconders in the Polling Station area.
  - Anti-social elements and their areas of influence.

*Ask the political parties to give their worry lists well in advance so that such polling stations are factored in the criticality analysis.*

- *The DEOs and ROs shall factor all the above inputs while finally identifying the critical polling stations for additional measures.*
- *The ECI Observer shall be consulted while finalizing the list of critical polling stations as per the above instructions*

# Critical Polling Stations-Security & Law and Order Sensitivity Reporting Format (Annexure-7 RO Handbook, 2014)

## Format on 'SECURITY and L&O-SENSITIVITY'

Name of the District –

Date –

Table 1

Item No.	No. and Name of AC	AC No.- AC Name – (Pl write AC totals)	AC No.- AC Name – (Pl write AC totals)	.....	Distt Name – (Pl write Distt. totals)
1	Total no. of PS in the AC				
2	No. of PS affected by Left Wing Extremism				
3	*No. of PS affected by Highly pronounced rivalry between political parties				
4	*No. of PS which are Highly politically sensitive				
5	No. of PS affected by Pronounced presence of criminals				
6	No. of PS affected by Communal tension				
7	No. of PS affected by Caste based tension				
8	No. of PS affected by any other reason causing vulnerability [Mention detail]				
9	No. of PS with >80% polling in PS area during last AC or PC election				
10	No. of PS with >75% votes bagged by 1 candidate in PS area during last AC or PC election				
11	*No. of PS with history of Re-Poll or Poll-Violence during last AC or PC election				
12	No. of PS with <60% EPIC coverage				
13	* Number of PS identified as Vulnerable				
14	* Number of Persons who have been identified as potential intimidators				
15	* Number of Localities/ Pockets/ Voter Segments identified as Vulnerable				

90%



Note 1 – For the Rows in the above Table with \* (asterisk), i.e. Row Nos. 3, 4 11, 13, 14 and 15, Lists of Names and relevant details are required to be necessarily appended.

Note 2 - The Table can be extended by increasing columns according to the number of ACs.

## Measures to be put in place for identified critical PS


The Presiding Officer shall be specially briefed to ensure that the EPIC/approved identification document if any, are properly verified and reflected in the remarks column of Form 17 A.

The presence of CPF may be ensured to safe guard the polling station.

The list of such polling stations shall be given to the Commanding/Assistant Commanding Officers of CPF so that they can also keep an eye on such polling stations.

A micro-observer may be deployed inside the polling station.

contd...



Digital camera or video camera shall be positioned in the polling station. The procedure for deploying such cameras has been given vide letter No.447/2007/PLN- IV, dated 17.01.2007.



Web-casting may be done in as many polling stations as possible.

# Thank You

NO VOTER TO BE LEFT BEHIND

