National Health Mission  
SDA Complex, Kasumpti, Shimla-9  
Himachal Pradesh  
Dated: Shimla-171009, the 12th March 2020

To  
All the Chief Medical Officers, Himachal Pradesh 
All the Principals, Government Medical Colleges, Himachal Pradesh 
All the Medical Superintendents, Himachal Pradesh 

Dated Shimla-9 the

Subject: Guidelines regarding COVID-19

Sir/Madam,

Please find enclosed the following guidelines as received from Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India for dissemination and further necessary action please:

2. Guidelines for Home quarantine.

You are requested to take further necessary action for the control of the disease.

Yours sincerely,

Special Secretary (Health) cum Mission Director, NHM
Himachal Pradesh, Shimla

Endst. No. As above. 

Dated Shimla-9 the

Copy to: 
1. The Additional Chief Secretary (Health) to the Govt. of Himachal for information please.
2. All Deputy Commissioners, Himachal Pradesh for information and necessary action please.
3. The Director Health Services, H.P. for information.
4. The Director Medical Education, H.P for information.

Special Secretary (Health) cum
Mission Director, NHM
Himachal Pradesh, Shimla – 9
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare
Directorate General of Health Services
[Emergency Medical Relief]

Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)

Guidelines on use of masks by public

1. Introduction

A new disease named novel coronavirus (COVID-19) emerged in early December 2019 in China and has now spread to over 90 countries. As on 9th March 2020, India has reported 42 cases mostly among those who had travelled from affected countries. It causes a minor illness in majority of patients with symptoms of fever and or cough. A small proportion of such persons may progress to severe disease with difficulty in breathing.

It is spread by an infected person with COVID coughing and the droplets from his cough infecting others in close vicinity (less than 1 metre).

Any such new disease invariably related to cough leads to suggestions from various quarters, especially in social media, to use mask by general public to prevent the disease.

2. Purpose of this document

The purpose of this document is to give correct evidence based information to general public on use of mask.

3. Medical masks

Medical masks of different size and shapes are available in the market. The common ones are flat pleated masks of woven fabric which covers the nose and mouth and affixed behind the head with straps/ elastic fasteners. There are also conical or duck bill shaped masks with valves (or without valves) that fit in the contour of face over the nose and mouth, but are costlier.

4. Use of masks by general public

4.1. Persons having no symptoms are not to use mask

Medical masks should not be used by healthy persons who are not having any symptoms because it create a false sense of security that can lead to neglecting other essential measures such as washing of hands.

Further, there is no scientific evidence to show health benefit of using masks for non-sick persons in the community. In fact erroneous use of masks or continuous use of a disposable mask for longer than 6 hours or repeated use of same mask may actually increase risk of getting an infection. It also incurs unnecessary cost.
In such situation, more effective steps are:

i. Wash hands frequently with soap and water for 40 seconds. An alcohol based hand sanitizer with 70% alcohol must be used for 20 seconds. If hands are dirty or soiled, do not use alcohol based hand sanitizer, but wash hands preferably with soap and water.

ii. While coughing or sneezing cover nose and mouth with handkerchief, paper tissue. If handkerchief or tissue paper is not available cough into the flexed elbow. Dispose of tissue immediately after use and wash hands.

iii. Refrain from touching face, mouth, nose and eyes.

iv. Stay at least a metre away from those coughing or sneezing.

v. Monitor your body temperature.

4.2. When and who should use medical masks (apart from health care worker).

4.2.1. When a person develops cough or fever.

Use of medical three layer masks when ill, will prevent your infection from spreading to others. However you also need to wash your hands frequently to avoid spreading infection to others.

4.2.2. While visiting a healthcare facility.

4.2.3. When you are caring for an ill person.

4.2.4. Close family contacts of such suspect/confirmed cases undergoing home care should also use Triple layer medical mask.

4.3. Duration for which a medical mask will remain effective

A medical mask, if properly worn, will be effective for 8 hours. If it gets wet in between, it needs to be changed immediately.

4.4. Correct procedure of wearing triple layer mask

While wearing a medical mask, the steps given below need to be followed. If you do not follow them, you may get infected from the mask itself. These steps are:

- Unfold the pleats; make sure that they are facing down.
- Place over nose, mouth and chin.
- Fit flexible nose piece (a metallic strip that can easily be located) over nose-bridge.
• Secure with tie strings (upper string to be tied on top of head above the ears – lower string at the back of the neck.)
• Ensure there are no gaps on either side of the mask, adjust to fit.
• While in use, avoid touching the mask.
• Do not let the mask hanging from the neck.
• Change the mask after six hours or as soon as they become wet.
• Disposable masks are never to be reused and should be disposed of.
• While removing the mask great care must be taken not to touch the potentially contaminated outer surface of the mask
• To remove mask first untie the string below and then the string above and handle the mask using the upperstrings.

4.5. Disposal of used masks

Used mask should be considered as potentially infected. Masks used by patients / care givers/ close contacts during home care should be disinfected using ordinary bleach solution (5%) or sodium hypochlorite solution (1%) and then disposed of either by burning or deep burial.
Scope

Detection of a travel related/unrelated suspect case of novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) will be followed by rapid isolation of such cases in designated health facilities and line listing of all contacts of such cases. Home quarantine is applicable to all such contacts of a suspect or confirmed case of COVID-19.

This intervention will be limited to the initial phase of India reporting only (i) travel related cases and (ii) focal clusters arising from a travel related/unrelated case where cluster containment strategy is adopted (iii) Persons coming from COVID-19 affected areas where local and community transmission is evident.

Definition of contact

A contact is defined as a healthy person that has been in such association with an infected person or a contaminated environment as to have exposed and is therefore at a higher risk of developing disease.

A contact in the context of COVID-19 is:

- A person living in the same household as a COVID-19 case;
- A person having had direct physical contact with a COVID-19 case or his/her infectious secretions without recommended personal protective equipment (PPE) or with a possible breach of PPE;
- A person who was in a closed environment or had face to face contact with a COVID-19 case at a distance of within 1 metre including air travel;

The epidemiological link may have occurred within a 14-day period before the onset of illness in the case under consideration.
Instructions for contacts being home quarantined

The home quarantined person should:

Stay in a well-ventilated single-room preferably with an attached/separate toilet. If another family member needs to stay in the same room, it's advisable to maintain a distance of at least 1 meter between the two.

- Needs to stay away from elderly people, pregnant women, children and persons with co-morbidities within the household.
- Restrict his/her movement within the house.
- Under no circumstances attend any social/religious gathering e.g. wedding, condolences, etc.

He should also follow the under mentioned public health measures at all times:

- Wash hand as often thoroughly with soap and water or with alcohol-based hand sanitizer
- Avoid sharing household items e.g. dishes, drinking glasses, cups, eating utensils, towels, bedding, or other items with other people at home.
- Wear a surgical mask at all the time. The mask should be changed every 6-8 hours and disposed off. Disposable masks are never to be reused.
- Masks used by patients / care givers/ close contacts during home care should be disinfected using ordinary bleach solution (5%) or sodium hypochlorite solution (1%) and then disposed of either by burning or deep burial.
- Used mask should be considered as potentially infected.
- If symptoms appear (cough/fever/difficulty in breathing), he/she should immediately inform the nearest health centre or call 011-23978046.

Instructions for the family members of persons being home quarantined

- Only an assigned family member should be tasked with taking care of the such person
- Avoid shaking the soiled linen or direct contact with skin
- Use disposable gloves when cleaning the surfaces or handling soiled linen
- Wash hands after removing gloves
- Visitors should not be allowed
- In case the person being quarantined becomes symptomatic, all his close contacts will be home quarantined (for 14 days) and followed up for an additional 14 days or till the report of such case turns out negative on lab testing
Environmental sanitation

a) Clean and disinfect frequently touched surfaces in the quarantined person’s room (e.g. bed frames, tables etc.) daily with 1% Sodium Hypochlorite Solution.

b) Clean and disinfect toilet surfaces daily with regular household bleach solution/phenolic disinfectants.

c) Clean the clothes and other linen used by the person separately using common household detergent and dry.

Duration of home quarantine

a) The home quarantine period is for 14 days from contact with a confirmed case or earlier if a suspect case (of whom the index person is a contact) turns out negative on laboratory testing.
Containment Plan

Novel Coronavirus Disease 2019

(COVID 19)

Ministry of Health & Family Welfare
Government of India
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

On 31<sup>st</sup> December 2019, the World Health Organization (WHO) China Country Office was informed of cases of pneumonia of unknown etiology (unknown cause) detected in Wuhan City, Hubei Province of China. On 7<sup>th</sup> January 2020, Chinese authorities identified a new strain of Coronavirus as the causative agent for the disease. The virus has been renamed by WHO as SARS-CoV-2 and the disease caused by it as COVID-19. The disease since its first detection has affected all the provinces of China and 40 other countries (including Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan). As per WHO (as of 26<sup>th</sup> February, 2020), there has been a total of 81109 confirmed cases of COVID-19 worldwide including 78191 confirmed cases and 2718 deaths reported from China. Besides China, 2918 confirmed cases and 44 deaths have been reported from 37 countries.

In India, as on 26<sup>th</sup> February, 2020, three travel related cases (from Hubei province, China), were reported (all from Kerala). All these cases were clinically stable during the period of hospitalization and discharged as per the discharge policy.

1.2 Risk Assessment

The risk for spread has been assessed by World Health Organization and currently (as on 26<sup>th</sup> February, 2020) it is very high for China and high at regional and global levels. WHO on 30<sup>th</sup> January, 2020 declared the current novel coronavirus outbreak as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). According to WHO, “all countries should be prepared for containment, including active surveillance, early detection, isolation and case management, contact tracing and prevention of onward spread of SARS-CoV-2 infection.

Clusters have appeared in many countries including USA, France, Germany and local transmission in Hong Kong, Singapore, Republic of Korea, Iran and Italy.

1.3 Epidemiology

Coronaviruses belong to a large family of viruses, some causing illness in people and others that circulate among animals, including camels, cats, bats etc. Rarely, animal corona viruses may evolve and infect people and then spread between people as witnessed during the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS, 2003) and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS, 2014). The etiologic agent responsible for current outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 is a novel coronavirus is closely related to SARS-Coronavirus.

In humans, the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 can occur via respiratory secretions (directly through droplets from coughing or sneezing, or indirectly through contaminated objects or surfaces as well as close contacts). Nosocomial transmission has been described as an important driver in the epidemiology of SARS and MERS and has also documented in COVID-19.
Current estimates of the incubation period of COVID range from 2-14 days, and these estimates will be refined as more data become available. Most common symptoms include **fever, fatigue, dry cough and breathing difficulty**. Upper respiratory tract symptoms like sore throat, rhinorrhoea, and gastrointestinal symptoms like diarrhoea and nausea/vomiting are seen in about 20% of cases.

Due to paucity of scientific literature based on community based studies, the available data on host factors is skewed towards cases requiring hospitalization. As per analysis of the biggest cohort reported by Chinese CDC, about 81% of the cases are mild, 14% require hospitalization and 5% require ventilator and critical care management. The deaths reported are mainly among elderly population particularly those with co-morbidities.

At the time of writing this document, many of the crucial epidemiological information particularly source of infection, mode of transmission, period of infectivity, etc. are still under investigation.

2. **STRATEGIC APPROACH**

India would be following a scenario based approach for the following possible scenarios:

i. Travel related case reported in India
ii. Local transmission of COVID-19
iii. Community Transmission of COVID-19 disease
iv. India becomes endemic for COVID-19

2.1. Strategic Approach for Current Scenario: “only travel related cases reported from India”

(i) Inter-ministerial coordination (Group of Ministers, Committee of Secretaries) and Centre-State Co-ordination been established.

(ii) Early Detection through Points of Entry (PoE) screening of passengers coming from China, Honk Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam through 21 designated airports, 12 major ports, 65 minor ports and 8 land crossings.

(iii) Surveillance and contact tracing through Integrated Disease Surveillance Programme (IDSP) for tracking travellers in the community who have travelled from affected countries and to detect clustering, if any, of acute respiratory illness.

(iv) Early diagnosis through a network of 15 laboratories of ICMR which are testing samples of suspect cases.

(v) Buffer stock of personal protective equipment maintained.

(vi) Risk communication for creating awareness among public to follow preventive public health measures.
2. 2. Local transmission of COVID-19 disease

The strategy will remain the same as explained in para 2.1 as above. In addition cluster containment strategy will be initiated with:

- Active surveillance in containment zone with contact tracing within and outside the containment zone.
- Expanding laboratory capacity for testing all suspect samples and
- Establishing surge capacities for isolating all suspect / confirmed cases for medical care.
- Implementing social distancing measures.
- Intensive risk communication.

3. SCOPE OF THIS DOCUMENT

In alignment with strategic approach, this document provides action that needs to be taken for containing a cluster. The actions for control of large outbreaks will be dealt separately under a mitigation plan.

4. OBJECTIVES

The objective of cluster containment is to stop transmission, morbidity and mortality due to COVID-19.

5. CLUSTER CONTAINMENT

5.1. Definition of Cluster

A cluster is defined as ‘an unusual aggregation of health events that are grouped together in time and space and that are reported to a health agency’ (Source CDC). Clusters of human cases are formed when there is local transmission. The local transmission is defined as a laboratory confirmed case of COVID-19:

(i) Who has not travelled from an area reporting confirmed cases of COVID-19 or

(ii) Who had no exposure to a person travelling from COVID-19 affected area or other known exposure to an infected person

There could be single or multiple foci of local transmission. There may or may not be an epidemiological link to a travel related case.

5.2. Cluster Containment Strategy

The cluster containment strategy would be to contain the disease within a defined geographic area by early detection, breaking the chain of transmission and thus preventing its spread to new areas. This would include geographic quarantine, social distancing measures, enhanced active surveillance, testing all suspected cases, isolation of cases, home quarantine of contacts, social mobilization to follow preventive public health measures.
5.3. Evidence base for cluster containment

Large scale measures to contain COVID-19 have been tried in China and Republic of Korea and also in countries that reported small clusters such as Germany, France, Singapore and Italy. Since COVID-19 is an airborne infection and there is efficient human to human transmission, success of containment operations cannot be guaranteed. Interventions to limit morbidity, mortality and social disruption associated with SARS in 2003 demonstrated that it was possible then to mobilize complex public health operation to contain SARS outbreak. Mathematical modeling studies suggest containment might be possible.

5.4. Factors affecting cluster containment

A number of variables determine the success of the containment operations. These are:

(i) Size of the cluster.
(ii) How efficiently the virus is transmitting in Indian population.
(iii) Time since first case/cluster of cases originated. Detection, laboratory confirmation and reporting of first few cases must happen quickly.
(iv) **Active case finding and laboratory diagnosis.**
(v) **Isolation of cases and quarantine of contacts.**
(vi) Geographical characteristics of the area (e.g. accessibility, natural boundaries)
(vii) Population density and their movement (including migrant population).
(viii) Resources that can be mobilized swiftly by the State Government/ Central Government.
(ix) Ability to ensure basic infrastructure and essential services.

5.5. Assumptions

(i) The virus is not circulating in Indian Population.
(ii) Even if there is a global pandemic, there is large part of the country which remains unaffected and large population which remains susceptible.

6. ACTION PLAN FOR CLUSTER CONTAINMENT

6.1. Institutional mechanisms and Inter-Sectoral Co-ordination

At the National Level, the National Crisis Management Committee (NCMC) will be activated. The co-ordination with health and non-health sectors will be managed by NCMC, on issues, flagged by Ministry of Health. Ministry of Health and Family Welfare will activate its Crisis Management Plan.
The Concerned State will activate State Crisis Management Committee or the State Disaster Management Authority, as the case may be to manage the clusters of COVID-19.

There will be daily co-ordination meetings between the centre and the concerned State through video conference.

The State should review the existing legal instruments to implement the containment plan. Some of the Acts/ Rules for consideration could be (i) Disaster Management Act (2005) (ii) Epidemic Act (1897) (iii) Cr.PC and (iv) State Specific Public Health Acts.

6.2. Trigger for Action

The trigger could be the IDSP identifying a cluster of Influenza like Illness (ILI) or Severe Acute Respiratory syndrome (SARI), which may or may not have epidemiological linkage to a travel related case. It could also be through other informal reporting mechanisms (Media/ civil society/ hospitals (government / private sector) etc. The State will ensure early diagnosis through the ICMR/VRDL (Virus Research and Diagnostic Laboratory) Network. A positive case will trigger a series of actions for containment of the cluster.

6.3. Deployment of Rapid Response Teams (RRT)

Emergency Medical Relief (EMR) division, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare will deploy the Central Rapid Response Team (RRT) to support and advice the State. The State will deploy its State RRT and District RRT.

6.4. Identify geographically-defined Containment zone and Buffer zone

6.4.1. Containment zone

The containment zone will be defined based on:

(i) The index case / cluster, which will be the designated epicenter
(ii) The listing and mapping of contacts
(iii) Geographical distribution of cases and contacts around the epicenter.
(iv) Administrative boundaries within urban cities /town/ rural area.

The RRT will do listing of cases, contacts and their mapping. This will help in deciding the perimeter for action. The decision of the geographic limit and extent of perimeter control will be that of the State Government. However, likely scenarios and possible characteristics of the containment and buffer zone are given in Table-1.
Table 1: Scenarios for determining containment and buffer zones

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S. No.</th>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Containment zone characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>A small cluster in closed environment such as residential schools, military barracks, hostels or a hospital.</td>
<td>Containment zone will be determined by the mapping of the persons in such institution including cases and contacts. A buffer zone of additional 5 Km radius* will be identified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Single cluster in a residential colony</td>
<td>Administrative boundary of the residential colony and a buffer zone of additional 5 Km radius.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Multiple clusters in communities (residential colony, schools, offices, hospitals etc.) with in an administrative jurisdiction</td>
<td>Administrative boundary of the urban district and a buffer zone of neighboring urban districts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Multiple clusters spatially separated in different parts administrative districts of a city</td>
<td>Administrative boundary of city/ town and congruent population in the peri-urban areas as the buffer zone. **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Cluster in a rural setting</td>
<td>3 Km radius of containment zone and additional 7 Kms radius of buffer zone.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The perimeter of the containment zone will be determined by the continuous real time risk assessment.

** The decision to follow a containment protocol will be based on the risk assessment and feasibility of perimeter control.

The Central RRT will help the State/ District administration in mapping the Containment Zone.

If the epidemiological assessment process is to take time (>12-24 hrs), then a containment zone of 3 Kms and a buffer zone of 7 Kms will be decided which may be subsequently revised, if required, based on epidemiologic investigation. Except for rural settings.
6.4.2. Buffer zone

Buffer zone is an area around the containment zone, where new cases are most likely to appear. There will not be any perimeter control for the buffer zone. The activities of buffer zone are listed under paragraph 7.2.

6.4.3. Perimeter

Perimeter of the containment zone will be decided by the District administration based on criteria defined in Para 6.4.1. Clear entry and exit points will be established. The perimeter controls that need to be applied is in para 7.3.

7. SURVEILLANCE

7.1. Surveillance in containment zone

7.1.1. Contact listing

The RRTs will list the contacts of the suspect / laboratory confirmed case of COVID-19. The District Surveillance Officer (in whose jurisdiction, the laboratory confirmed case/ suspect case falls) along with the RRT will map the contacts to determine the potential spread of the disease. If the residential address of the contact is beyond that district, the district IDSP will inform the concerned District IDSP/State IDSP.

7.1.2. Mapping of the containment and buffer zones

The containment and buffer zones will be mapped to identify the health facilities (both government and private) and health workforce available (primary healthcare workers, Anganwadi workers and doctors in PHCs/CHCs/District hospitals).

7.1.3. Active Surveillance

The residential areas will be divided into sectors for the ASHAs/Anganwadi workers/ANMs each covering 50 households (30 households in difficult areas). Additional workforce would be mobilized from neighboring districts (except buffer zone) to cover all the households in the containment zone. This workforce will have supervisory officers (PHC/CHC doctors) in the ratio of 1:4.

The field workers will be performing active house to house surveillance daily in the containment zone from 8:00 AM to 2:00 PM. They will line list the family members and those having symptoms. The field worker will provide a mask to the suspect case and to the care giver identified by the family. The patient will be isolated at home till such time he/she is examined by the supervisory officer. They will also follow up contacts identified by the RRTs within the sector allocated to them.
All ILI/SARI cases reported in the last 14 days by the IDSP in the containment zone will be tracked and reviewed to identify any missed case of COVID-19 in the community.

Any case falling within the case definition will be conveyed to the supervisory officer who in turn will visit the house of the concerned, confirm that diagnosis as per case definition and will make arrangements to shift the suspect case to the designated treatment facility. The supervisory officer will collect data from the health workers under him/her, collate and provide the daily and cumulative data to the control room by 4.00 P.M. daily.

7.1.4 Passive Surveillance

All health facilities in the containment zone will be listed as a part of mapping exercise. All such facilities both in Government and private sector (including clinics) shall report clinically suspect cases of COVID-19 on real time basis (including ‘Nil’ reports) to the control room at the district level.

7.1.5 Contact Tracing

The contacts of the laboratory confirmed case/suspect case of COVID-19 will be line-listed and tracked and kept under surveillance at home for 28 days (by the designated field worker). The Supervisory officer in whose jurisdiction, the laboratory confirmed case/suspect case falls shall inform the Control Room about all the contacts and their residential addresses. The control room will in turn inform the supervisory officers of concerned sectors for surveillance of the contacts. If the residential address of the contact is beyond the allotted sector, the district IDSP will inform the concerned Supervisory officer/concerned District IDSP/State IDSP.

7.2 Surveillance in Buffer zone

The surveillance activities to be followed in the buffer zone are as follows:

i. Review of ILI/SARI cases reported in the last 14 days by the District Health Officials to identify any missed case of COVID-19 in the community.

ii. Enhanced passive surveillance for ILI and SARI cases in the buffer zone through the existing Integrated Disease Surveillance Programme.

iii. In case of any identified case of ILI/SARI, sample should be collected and sent to the designated laboratories for testing COVID-19.

All health facilities in the buffer zone will be listed as a part of mapping exercise. All such facilities both in Government and private sector (including clinics) shall report clinically suspect cases of COVID-19 on real time basis (including ‘Nil’ reports) to the control room at the district level. Measures such as personal hygiene, hand hygiene, social distancing to be enhanced through enhanced IEC activities in the buffer zone.
7.3. Perimeter Control

The perimeter control will ensure that there is no unchecked outward movement of population from the containment zone except for maintaining essential services (including medical emergencies) and government business continuity. It will also limit unchecked influx of population into the containment zone. The authorities at these entry points will be required to inform the incoming travelers about precautions to be taken and will also provide such travelers with an information pamphlet and mask.

All vehicular movement, movement of public transport and personnel movement will be restricted. All roads including rural roads connecting the containment zone will be guarded by police.

The District administration will post signs and create awareness informing public about the perimeter control. Health workers posted at the exit point will perform screening (e.g. interview travelers, measure temperature, record the place and duration of intended visit and keep complete record of intended place of stay).

Details of all persons moving out of perimeter zone for essential/ emergency services will be recorded and they will be followed up through IDSP. All vehicles moving out of the perimeter control will be decontaminated with sodium hypochlorite (1%) solution.

8. LABORATORY SUPPORT

8.1 Designated laboratories

The identified VRDL network laboratory, nearest to the affected area, will be further strengthened to test samples. The other available govt. laboratories and private laboratories (BSL 2 following BSL 3 precautions) if required, shall also be engaged to test samples, after ensuring quality assurance by ICMR/VRDL network. If the number of samples exceeds its surge capacity, samples will be shipped to other nearby laboratories or to NCDC, Delhi or NIV, Pune or to other ICMR lab networks depending upon geographic proximity.

All test results should be available within 12 hours of sampling. ICMR along with the State Government will ensure that there are designated agencies for sample transportation to identified laboratories. The contact number of such courier agencies shall be a part of the micro-plan.

The designated laboratory will provide daily update (daily and cumulative) to District, State and Central Control Rooms on:

i. No. of samples received
ii. No. of samples tested
iii. No. of samples under testing
iv. No. of positive samples

8.2 Testing criteria

All suspect cases conforming to the case definition will be tested. The testing of suspect cases in the containment and buffer zones will continue till 14 days from the date, the last confirmed case is declared negative by laboratory test.

9. HOSPITAL CARE

All suspect cases detected in the containment/buffer zones (till a diagnosis is made), will be hospitalized and kept in isolation in a designated facility till such time they are tested negative. Persons testing positive for COVID-19 will remain to be hospitalized till such time 2 of their samples are tested negative as per MoHFW’s discharge policy. About 15% of the patients are likely to develop pneumonia, 5% of whom requires ventilator management. Hence dedicated Intensive care beds need to be identified earmarked. Some among them may progress to multi organ failure and hence critical care facility/dialysis facility/ and Salvage therapy [Extra Corporeal Membrane Oxygenator (ECMO)] facility for managing the respiratory/renal complications/ multi-organ failure shall be required. If such facilities are not available in the containment zone, nearest tertiary care facility in Government/private sector needs to be identified, that becomes a part of the micro-plan.

9.1 Surge capacity

Based on the risk assessment, if the situation so warrants (data suggested an exponential rise in the number of cases), the surge capacity of the identified hospitals will be enhanced, private hospitals will be roped in and sites for temporary hospitals identified and it’s logistic requirements shall be worked out.

9.2 Pre-hospital care (ambulance facility)

Ambulances need to be in place for transportation of suspect/confirmed cases. Such ambulances shall be manned by personnel adequately trained in infection prevention control, use of PPE and protocol that needs to be followed for disinfection of ambulances (by 1% sodium hypochlorite solution using knapsack sprayers).

9.3 Infection Prevention Control Practices

Nosocomial infection in fellow patients and attending healthcare personnel are well documented in the current COVID-19 outbreak as well. There shall be strict adherence to Infection prevention control practices in all health facilities. IPC committees would be formed (if not already in place) with the mandate to ensure that all healthcare personnel are well aware of IPC practices and suitable arrangements for requisite PPE and other logistic (hand sanitizer, soap, water etc.) are in place. The designated hospitals will ensure that all healthcare staff is trained in washing of hands, respiratory etiquettes, donning/doffing & proper disposal of PPEs and bio-medical waste management.
At all times doctors, nurses and para-medics working in the clinical areas will wear three layered surgical mask and gloves. The medical personnel working in isolation and critical care facilities will wear full complement of PPE (including N95 masks).

The support staff engaged in cleaning and disinfection will also wear full complement of PPE. Environmental cleaning should be done twice daily and consist of damp dusting and floor mopping with Lysol or other phenolic disinfectants and cleaning of surfaces with sodium hypochlorite solution. Detailed guidelines available on MoHFW’s website may be followed.

10. CLINICAL MANAGEMENT

10.1. Clinical Management

The hospitalized cases may require symptomatic treatment for fever. Paracetamol is the drug of choice. Suspect cases with co-morbid conditions, if any, will require appropriate management of co-morbid conditions.

For patients with severe acute respiratory illness (SARI), having respiratory distress may require, pulse oxymetry, oxygen therapy, non-invasive and invasive ventilator therapy. Detailed guidelines available on MoHFW’s website and updated from time to time, may be followed.

10.2. Discharge Policy

Discharge policy for suspected cases of COVID-19 tested negative will be based on the clinical assessment of the treating physician. For those tested positive for COVID-19, their discharge from hospital will be governed by consecutive two samples tested negative and the patient is free from symptoms.

11. PHARMACEUTICAL INTERVENTIONS

As of now there is no approved drug or vaccine for treatment of COVID-19.

12. NON-PHARMACEUTICAL INTERVENTIONS

In the absence of proven drug or vaccine, non-pharmaceutical interventions will be the main stay for containment of COVID-19 cluster.

12.1. Preventive public health measures

There will be social mobilization among the population in containment and buffer zone for adoption of community-wide practice of frequent washing of hands and respiratory etiquettes in schools, colleges, work places and homes. The community will also be encouraged to self-
monitor their health and report to the visiting ASHA/Anganwadi worker or to nearest health facility.

12.2. Quarantine and isolation

Quarantine and Isolation are important mainstay of cluster containment. These measures help by breaking the chain of transmission in the community.

12.2.1. Quarantine

Quarantine refers to separation of individuals who are not yet ill but have been exposed to COVID-19 and therefore have a potential to become ill. There will be voluntary home quarantine of contacts of suspect /confirmed cases. The guideline on home quarantine available on the website of the Ministry provides detail guidance on home quarantine.

12.2.2. Isolation

Isolation refers to separation of individuals who are ill and suspected or confirmed of COVID-19. There are various modalities of isolating a patient. Ideally, patients can be isolated in individual isolation rooms or negative pressure rooms with 12 or more air-changes per hour.

In resource constrained settings, all positive COVID-19 cases can be cohorted in a ward with good ventilation. Similarly, all suspect cases should also be cohorted in a separate ward. However under no circumstances these cases should be mixed up. A minimum distance of 1 meter needs to be maintained between adjacent beds. All such patients need to wear a triple layer surgical mask at all times.

12.3 Social distancing measures

For the cluster containment, social distancing measures are key interventions to rapidly curtail the community transmission of COVID-19 by limiting interaction between infected persons and susceptible hosts. The following measures would be taken:

12.3.1 Closure of schools, colleges and work places

Administrative orders will be issued to close schools, colleges and work places in containment and buffer zones. Intensive risk communication campaign will be followed to encourage all persons to stay indoors for an initial period of 28 days, to be extended based on the risk assessment. Based on the risk assessment and indication of successful containment operations, an approach of staggered work and market hours may be put into practice.

12.3.2 Cancellation of mass gatherings

All mass gathering events and meetings in public or private places, in the containment and buffer zones shall be cancelled / banned till such time, the area is declared to be free of COVID-19 or the outbreak has increased to such scales to warrant mitigation measures instead of containment.
12.3.3. Advisory to avoid public places

The public in the containment and buffer zones will be advised to avoid public places and only if necessary for attending to essential services. The administration will ensure supply of enough triple layer masks to the households in the containment and buffer zones.

12.3.4. Cancellation of public transport (bus/rail)

There will be prohibition for persons entering the containment zone and on persons exiting the containment zone. To facilitate this, if there are major bus transit hubs or railway stations in the containment zone, the same would be made dysfunctional temporarily. Additionally, irrespective of fact that there is a rail/road transit hub, the perimeter control will take care of prohibiting people exiting the containment zone including those using private vehicles and taxies.

As a significant inconvenience is caused to the public by adopting these measures in the containment zone, State government would proactively engage the community and work with them to make them understand the benefits of such measures.

13. MATERIAL LOGISTICS

13.1. Personal Protective Equipment

The type of personal protective equipment for different categories of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S. No.</th>
<th>Name of the item</th>
<th>Category of personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1      | PPE Kit, N 95, Mask, Gloves, Goggles, cap and shoe cover | □ Doctors and nurses attending to patients in isolation, ICU/critical care facilities of hospitals in the containment zone.  
□ Para-medical staff in the back cabin of ambulance.  
□ Auxillary/ support staff involved in disinfection vehicles/ambulances and surface cleaning of hospital floors and other surfaces |
| 2      | N-95 Mask and gloves | □ Supervisory doctors verifying a suspect case  
□ Persons collecting samples.  
□ Doctors/nurses attending patients in primary health care facilities |
| 3      | Triple Layer Surgical mask | □ To be used by Field workers doing surveillance work  
□ Staff providing essential services.  
□ Suspect cases and care giver / by stander of the suspect case  
□ Security staff.  
□ Ambulance drivers  
□ Residents permitted to go out for essential services |

The State Government has to ensure adequate stock of personal protective equipment. The quantity required for a containment operation will depend upon the size & extent of the cluster and the time required containing it. **A containment of a cluster, lasting a month or two**
in a population of 100,000 may require 20,00,000 triple layer masks; 2,00,000 gloves; 100,000 N-95 masks and about 50,000 PPE Kits. The foregoing number is to illustrate that State need to have a rate contract and assured supply for these items.

13.2. Transportation

A large number of vehicles will be required for mobilizing the surveillance and supervisory teams. The vehicles will be pooled from Government departments. The shortfall, if any, will be met by hiring of vehicles.

13.3. Stay arrangements for the field staff

The field staff brought in for the surveillance activities and that for providing perimeter control need to be accommodated with in the containment zone. Facilities such as schools, community buildings etc. will be identified for sheltering. Catering arrangement will need to be made at these locations.

13.4 Bio-medical wastemanagement

A large quantity of bio-medical waste is expected to be generated from containment zone. Arrangement would also be required for such bio-medical waste (discarded PPEs etc.), preferably by utilizing the bio-medical waste management services at the designated hospital.

14. RISK COMMUNICATION

14.1 Risk communication material

Risk communication materials [comprising of (i) posters and pamphlets; (ii) audio only material; (iii) AV films] prepared by PIB/MoHFW will be prepared and kept ready for targeted roll out in the containment and buffer zones.

14.2 Communication channels

14.2.1 Interpersonal communication

During house to house surveillance, ASHAs/ other community health workers will interact with the community (i) for reporting symptomatic cases (ii) contact tracing (iii) information on preventive public health measures.

14.2.2 Mass communication

Awareness will be created among the community through miking, distribution of pamphlets, mass SMS and social media. Also use of radio and television (using local channels) will ensure penetration of health messages in the target community.
14.2.3 Dedicated helpline
A dedicated helpline number will be provided at the Control room (district headquarter) and its number will be widely circulated for providing general population with information on risks of COVID-19 transmission, the preventive measures required and the need for prompt reporting to health facilities, availability of essential services and administrative orders on perimeter control.

14.2.4 Media Management
At the Central level, only Secretary (H) or representative nominated by her shall address the media. There will be regular press briefings/ press releases to keep media updated on the developments and avoid stigmatization of affected communities. Every effort shall be made to address and dispel any misinformation circulating in media incl. social media.

At the State level, only Principal Secretary (H), his/her nominee will speak to the media.

15. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

15.1 Control room at State & District Headquarters
A control room (if not already in place) shall be set up at State and District headquarters. This shall be manned by State and District Surveillance Officer (respectively) under which data managers (deployed from IDSP/ NHM) responsible for collecting, collating and analyzing data from field and health facilities. Daily situation reports will be put up.

The state will provide aggregate data on daily basis on the following (for the day and cumulative):

   i. Total number of suspect cases
   ii. Total number of confirmed cases
   iii. Total number of critical cases on ventilator
   iv. Total number of deaths
   v. Total number of contacts under surveillance

15.2 Control room in the containment zone
A control room shall be set up inside the containment zone to facilitate collection, collation and dissemination of data from various field units to District and State control rooms. This shall be manned by an epidemiologist under which data managers (deployed from IDSP/ NHM) will be responsible for collecting, collating and analyzing data from field and health facilities.

This control room will provide daily input to the District control room for preparation of daily situation report.
15.3 Alerting the neighboring districts/States
The control room at State Government will alert all neighboring districts. There shall be enhanced surveillance in all such districts for detection of clustering of symptomatic illness. Awareness will be created in the community for them to report symptomatic cases/contacts.

Also suitable provisions shall be created for enhancing horizontal communication between adjacent districts, especially for contact tracing exercise and follow up of persons exiting the containment zone.

16. CAPACITY BUILDING

16.1 Training content
Trainings will be designed to suit requirement of each and every section of healthcare worker involved in the containment operations. These trainings for different target groups shall cover:
1. Field surveillance, contact tracing, data management and reporting
2. Surveillance at designated exit points from the containment zone
3. Sampling, packaging and shipment of specimen
4. Hospital infection prevention and control including use of appropriate PPEs and biomedical waste management
5. Clinical care of suspect and confirmed cases including ventilator management, critical care management
6. Risk communication to general community

16.2 Target trainee population
Various sections of healthcare workforce (including specialist doctors, medical officers, nurses, ANMs, Block Extension Educators, MHWs, ASHAs) and workforce from non-health sector (security personnel, Anganwadi Workers, support staff etc.). Trainings will be tailored to requirements of each of these sections.

The training will be conducted by the RRT a day prior to containment operations are initiated.

16.3 Replication of training in other districts
The State Govt. will ensure that unaffected districts are also trained along the same lines so as to strengthen the core capacities of their RRTs, doctors, nurses, support staff and non-health field formations. These trainings should be accompanied with functional training exercises like mock-drills.
17. FINANCING OF CONTAINMENT OPERATIONS

The fund requirement would be estimated taking into account the inputs in the micro-plan and funds will be made available to the district collector from NHM flexi-fund.

17.1 Scaling down of operations

The operations will be scaled down if no secondary laboratory confirmed COVID-19 case is reported from the containment and buffer zones for at-least 4 weeks after the last confirmed test has been isolated and all his contacts have been followed up for 28 days. The containment operation shall be deemed to be over 28 days from the discharge of last confirmed case (following negative tests as per discharge policy) from the designated health facility i.e. when the follow up of hospital contacts will be complete.

The closing of the surveillance for the clusters could be independent of one another provided there is no geographic continuity between clusters. However the surveillance will continue for ILI/SARI.

However, if the containment plan is not able to contain the outbreak and large numbers of cases start appearing, then a decision will need to be taken by State administration to abandon the containment plan and start on mitigation activities.

18. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MICRO-PLAN

Based on the above activities, the State/ District will prepare an event specific micro-plan and implement the containment operations.
Guidelines on Clinical management of severe acute respiratory illness (SARI) in suspect/confirmed novel coronavirus (nCoV) cases

Coronaviruses are respiratory viruses and broadly distributed in humans and other mammals. Some causing illness in people and others that circulate among animals, including camels, cats and bats. Rarely, animal corona viruses can evolve and infect people and then spread between people such as has been seen with MERS and SARS. Although most human coronavirus infections are mild, the epidemics of the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV) and Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), have caused more than 10000 cumulative cases in the past two decades, with mortality rates of 10% for SARS-CoV and 37% for MERS-CoV. The current outbreak was initially noticed in a seafood market in Wuhan city in Hubei Province of China on 12th December, 2019 and has spread across China and many countries.

Purpose and scope of document

This document is intended for clinicians taking care of hospitalised adult and paediatric patients with severe acute respiratory infection (SARI) when an nCoV infection is suspected. It is not meant to replace clinical judgment or specialist consultation but rather to strengthen clinical management of these patients and provide to up-to-date guidance. Best practices for SARI including IPC and optimized supportive care for severely ill patients are essential.

This document aims to provide clinicians with updated interim guidance on timely, effective, and safe supportive management of patients with nCoV and SARI, particularly those with critical illness. The recommendations in this document are derived from WHO publications.

A. Triage: Early recognition of patients with SARI associated with nCoV infection.

The purpose of triage is to recognize and sort all patients with SARI at first point of contact with health care system (such as the emergency department). (Consider nCOV as a possible etiology of SARI under certain conditions (see Table 1). Triage patients and start emergency treatments based on disease severity.

Table 1: Definitions of patients with SARI, suspected of nCoV*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SARI</th>
<th>An ARI with history of fever or measured temperature ≥38°C and cough; onset within the last ~10 days; and requiring hospitalization. However, the absence of fever does NOT exclude viral infection.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance case definitions for nCoV*</td>
<td>1. Severe acute respiratory infection (SARI) in a person, with history of fever and cough requiring admission to hospital, with no other etiology that fully explains the clinical presentation’ (clinicians should also be alert to the possibility of atypical presentations in patients who are immunocompromised); AND any of the following: a) A history of travel to Wuhan, Hubei Province China in the 14 days prior to symptom onset; or b) the disease occurs in a health care worker who has been working in an environment where patients with severe acute respiratory infections are being cared for, without regard to place of residence or history of travel; or c) the person develops an unusual or unexpected clinical course, especially sudden deterioration despite appropriate treatment, without regard to place of residence or history of travel, even if another etiology has been identified that fully explains the clinical presentation 2. A person with acute respiratory illness of any degree of severity who,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
within 14 days before onset of illness, had any of the following exposures:

- close physical contact\(^2\) with a confirmed case of nCoV infection, while that patient was symptomatic; or
- a healthcare facility in a country where hospital-associated nCoV infections have been reported;

* see https://mohfw.gov.in/media/disease-alerts for latest case definition

1- Testing should be according to local guidance for management of community-acquired pneumonia. Examples of other etiologies include Streptococcus pneumoniae, Haemophilus influenza type B, Legionella pneumophila, other recognized primary bacterial pneumonias, influenza viruses, and respiratory syncytial virus.

2- Close contact is defined as:
- Health care associated exposure, including providing direct care for nCoV patients, working with health care workers infected with nCoV, visiting patients or staying in the same close environment of a nCoV patient
- Working together in close proximity or sharing the same classroom environment with a with nCoV patient
- Traveling together with nCoV patient in any kind of conveyance
- Living in the same household as a nCoV patient

The epidemiological link may have occurred within a 14-day period before or after the onset of illness in the case under consideration

Novel Coronavirus may present with mild, moderate, or severe illness; the latter includes severe pneumonia, ARDS, sepsis and septic shock. Early recognition of suspected patients allows for timely initiation of IPC (see Table 2). Early identification of those with severe manifestations (see Table 2) allows for immediate optimized supportive care treatments and safe, rapid admission (or referral) to intensive care unit according to institutional or national protocols. For those with mild illness, hospitalization may not be required unless there is concern for rapid deterioration. All patients discharged home should be instructed to return to hospital if they develop any worsening of illness.

### Table 2: Clinical syndromes associated with nCoV infection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Uncomplicated illness</th>
<th>Patients with uncomplicated upper respiratory tract viral infection, may have non-specific symptoms such as fever, cough, sore throat, nasal congestion, malaise, headache, muscle pain or malaise. The elderly and immunosuppressed may present with atypical symptoms. These patients do not have any signs of dehydration, sepsis or shortness of breath</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mild pneumonia</td>
<td>Patient with pneumonia and no signs of severe pneumonia. Child with non-severe pneumonia has cough or difficulty breathing + fast breathing: fast breathing (in breaths/min): &lt;2 months, ≥60; 2–11 months, ≥50; 1–5 years, ≥40 and no signs of severe pneumonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe pneumonia</td>
<td>Adolescent or adult: fever or suspected respiratory infection, plus one of respiratory rate &gt;30 breaths/min, severe respiratory distress, or SpO2 &lt;90% on room air Child with cough or difficulty in breathing, plus at least one of the following: central cyanosis or SpO2 &lt;90%; severe respiratory distress (e.g. grunting, very severe chest indrawing); signs of pneumonia with a general danger sign: inability to breastfeed or drink, lethargy or unconsciousness, or convulsions. Other signs of pneumonia may be present: chest indrawing, fast breathing (in breaths/min): &lt;2 months, ≥60; 2–11 months, ≥50; 1–5 years, ≥40. The diagnosis is clinical; chest imaging can exclude complications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome</td>
<td><strong>Onset</strong>: new or worsening respiratory symptoms within one week of known clinical insult. <strong>Chest imaging (radiograph, CT scan, or lung ultrasound)</strong>: bilateral opacities, not fully explained by effusions, lobar or lung collapse, or nodules.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Origin of oedema**: respiratory failure not fully explained by cardiac failure or fluid overload. Need objective assessment (e.g. echocardiography) to exclude hydrostatic cause of oedema if no risk factor present.

**Oxygenation (adults):**
- Mild ARDS: 200 mmHg < PaO2/FiO2 ≤ 300 mmHg (with PEEP or CPAP ≥5 cm H2O, or non-ventilated)
- Moderate ARDS: 100 mmHg < PaO2/FiO2 ≤200 mmHg with PEEP ≥5 cm H2O, or non-ventilated)
- Severe ARDS: PaO2/FiO2 ≤ 100 mmHg with PEEP ≥5 cmH2O, or non-ventilated)
- When PaO2 is not available, SpO2/FiO2 ≤315 suggests ARDS (including in non-ventilated patients)

Oxygenation (children; note OI = Oxygenation Index and OSI = Oxygenation Index using SpO2)
- Bilevel NIV or CPAP ≥5 cmH2O via full face mask: PaO2/FiO2 ≤ 300 mmHg or SpO2/FiO2 ≤ 264
- Mild ARDS (invasively ventilated): 4 ≤ OI < 8 or 5 ≤ OSI < 7.5
- Moderate ARDS (invasively ventilated): 8 ≤ OI < 16 or 7.5 ≤ OSI < 12.3
- Severe ARDS (invasively ventilated): OI ≥ 16 or OSI ≥ 12.3

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**Sepsis**

**Adults**: life-threatening organ dysfunction caused by a dysregulated host response to suspected or proven infection, with organ dysfunction. Signs of organ dysfunction include: altered mental status, difficult or fast breathing, low oxygen saturation, reduced urine output, fast heart rate, weak pulse, cold extremities or low blood pressure, skin mottling, or laboratory evidence of coagulopathy, thrombocytopenia, acidosis, high lactate or hyperbilirubinemia.

**Children**: suspected or proven infection and ≥2 SIRS criteria, of which one must be abnormal temperature or white blood cell count

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**Septic shock**

**Adults**: persisting hypotension despite volume resuscitation, requiring vasopressors to maintain MAP ≥65 mmHg and serum lactate level ≥2 mmol/L.

**Children**: any hypotension (SBP <5th centile or >2 SD below normal for age) or 2-3 of the following: altered mental state; tachycardia or bradycardia (HR <90 bpm or >160 bpm in infants and HR <70 bpm or >150 bpm in children); prolonged capillary refill (>2 sec) or warm vasodilation with bounding pulses; tachypnea; mottled skin or petechial or purpuric rash; increased lactate; oliguria; hyperthermia or hypothermia

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### B. Immediate implementation of appropriate IPC measures

IPC is a critical and integral part of clinical management of patients and should be initiated at the point of entry of the patient to hospital (typically the Emergency Department). Standard precautions should always be routinely applied in all areas of health care facilities. Standard precautions include hand hygiene; use of PPE to avoid direct contact with patients’ blood, body fluids, secretions (including respiratory secretions) and non-intact skin. Standard precautions also include prevention of needle-stick or sharps injury; safe waste management; cleaning and disinfection of equipment; and cleaning of the environment.

Table 3: How to implement infection prevention and control measures for patients with suspected or confirmed nCoV infection

| At triage | • Give suspect patient a medical mask and direct patient to separate area, an isolation room if available. Keep at least 1 meter distance between suspected patients and other patients. Instruct all patients to cover nose and mouth during coughing or sneezing with tissue or flexed elbow for others. Perform |

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| Apply droplet precautions | - Droplet precautions prevent large droplet transmission of respiratory viruses. Use a medical mask if working within 1-2 metres of the patient. Place patients in single rooms, or group together those with the same etiological diagnosis. If an etiological diagnosis is not possible, group patients with similar clinical diagnosis and based on epidemiological risk factors, with a spatial separation. When providing care in close contact with a patient with respiratory symptoms (e.g. coughing or sneezing), use eye protection (face-mask or goggles), because sprays of secretions may occur. Limit patient movement within the institution and ensure that patients wear medical masks when outside their rooms |
| Apply contact precautions | - Droplet and contact precautions prevent direct or indirect transmission from contact with contaminated surfaces or equipment (i.e. contact with contaminated oxygen tubing/interfaces). Use PPE (medical mask, eye protection, gloves and gown) when entering room and remove PPE when leaving. If possible, use either disposable or dedicated equipment (e.g. stethoscopes, blood pressure cuffs and thermometers). If equipment needs to be shared among patients, clean and disinfect between each patient use. Ensure that health care workers refrain from touching their eyes, nose, and mouth with potentially contaminated gloved or ungloved hands. Avoid contaminating environmental surfaces that are not directly related to patient care (e.g. door handles and light switches). Ensure adequate room ventilation. Avoid movement of patients or transport. Perform hand hygiene |
| Apply airborne precautions when performing an aerosol generating procedure | - Ensure that healthcare workers performing aerosol-generating procedures (i.e. open suctioning of respiratory tract, intubation, bronchoscopy, cardiopulmonary resuscitation) use PPE, including gloves, long-sleeved gowns, eye protection, and fit-tested particulate respirators (N95 or equivalent, or higher level of protection). (The scheduled fit test should not be confused with user seal check before each use.) Whenever possible, use adequately ventilated single rooms when performing aerosol-generating procedures, meaning negative pressure rooms with minimum of 12 air changes per hour or at least 160 litres/second/patient in facilities with natural ventilation. Avoid the presence of unnecessary individuals in the room. Care for the patient in the same type of room after mechanical ventilation commences |

Abbreviations: ARI, acute respiratory infection; PPE, personal protective equipment

C. Early supportive therapy and monitoring

a. Give supplemental oxygen therapy immediately to patients with SARI and respiratory distress, hypoxaemia, or shock: Initiate oxygen therapy at 5 L/min and titrate flow rates to reach target SpO₂ ≥90% in non-pregnant adults and SpO₂ ≥92-95 % in pregnant patients. Children with emergency signs (obstructed or absent breathing, severe respiratory distress, central cyanosis, shock, coma or convulsions) should receive oxygen therapy during resuscitation to target SpO₂ ≥94%; otherwise, the target SpO₂ is ≥90%. All areas where patients with SARI are cared for should be equipped with pulse oximeters, functioning oxygen systems and disposable, single-use, oxygen-delivering interfaces (nasal cannula, simple face mask, and mask with reservoir bag). Use contact precautions when handling contaminated oxygen interfaces of patients with nCoV infection
b. Use conservative fluid management in patients with SARI when there is no evidence of shock: Patients with SARI should be treated cautiously with intravenous fluids, because aggressive fluid
resuscitation may worsen oxygenation, especially in settings where there is limited availability of mechanical ventilation

c. Give empiric antimicrobials to treat all likely pathogens causing SARI. Give antimicrobials within one hour of initial patient assessment for patients with sepsis: Although the patient may be suspected to have nCoV, administer appropriate empiric antimicrobials within ONE hour of identification of sepsis. Empiric antibiotic treatment should be based on the clinical diagnosis (community-acquired pneumonia, health care-associated pneumonia [if infection was acquired in healthcare setting], or sepsis), local epidemiology and susceptibility data, and treatment guidelines. Empiric therapy includes a neuraminidase inhibitor for treatment of influenza when there is local circulation or other risk factors, including travel history or exposure to animal influenza viruses.18 Empiric therapy should be de-escalated on the basis of microbiology results and clinical judgment

d. Do not routinely give systemic corticosteroids for treatment of viral pneumonia or ARDS outside of clinical trials unless they are indicated for another reason: A systematic review of observational studies of corticosteroids administered to patients with SARS reported no survival benefit and possible harms (avascular necrosis, psychosis, diabetes, and delayed viral clearance). A systematic review of observational studies in influenza found a higher risk of mortality and secondary infections with corticosteroids; the evidence was judged as very low to low quality due to confounding by indication. A subsequent study that addressed this limitation by adjusting for time-varying confounders found no effect on mortality. Finally, a recent study of patients receiving corticosteroids for MERS used a similar statistical approach and found no effect of corticosteroids on mortality but delayed lower respiratory tract (LRT) clearance of MERS-CoV. Given lack of effectiveness and possible harm, routine corticosteroids should be avoided unless they are indicated for another reason. See section F for the use of corticosteroids in sepsis.

e. Closely monitor patients with SARI for signs of clinical deterioration, such as rapidly progressive respiratory failure and sepsis, and apply supportive care interventions immediately: Application of timely, effective, and safe supportive therapies is the cornerstone of therapy for patients that develop severe manifestations of nCoV

f. Understand the patient’s co-morbid condition(s) to tailor the management of critical illness and appreciate the prognosis: During intensive care management of SARI, determine which chronic therapies should be continued and which therapies should be stopped temporarily

g. Communicate early with patient and family: Communicate proactively with patients and families and provide support and prognostic information. Understand the patient’s values and preferences regarding life-sustaining interventions

D. Collection of specimens for laboratory diagnosis

Guidance on specimen collection, processing, transportation, including related biosafety procedures, is available on [https://mohfw.gov.in/media/disease-alerts](https://mohfw.gov.in/media/disease-alerts)

Points to remember

* Collect blood cultures for bacteria that cause pneumonia and sepsis, ideally before antimicrobial therapy. DO NOT delay antimicrobial therapy to collect blood cultures
* Collect specimens from BOTH the upper respiratory tract (URT; nasopharyngeal and oropharyngeal) AND lower respiratory tract (LRT; expectorated sputum, endotracheal aspirate, or bronchoalveolar lavage) for nCoV testing by RT-PCR. Clinicians may elect to collect only LRT samples when these are readily available (for example, in mechanically ventilated patients)
Use appropriate PPE for specimen collection (droplet and contact precautions for URT specimens; airborne precautions for LRT specimens). When collecting URT samples, use viral swabs (sterile Dacron or rayon, not cotton) and viral transport media. Do not sample the nostrils or tonsils. In a patient with suspected novel coronavirus, especially with pneumonia or severe illness, a single URT sample does not exclude the diagnosis, and additional URT and LRT samples are recommended. LRT (vs. URT) samples are more likely to be positive and for a longer period. Clinicians may elect to collect only LRT samples when these are readily available (for example, in mechanically ventilated patients). Sputum induction should be avoided due to increased risk of increasing aerosol transmission.

Dual infections with other respiratory viral infections have been found in SARS and MERS cases. At this stage we need detailed microbiologic studies in all suspected cases. Both URT and LRT specimens can tested for other respiratory viruses, such as influenza A and B (including zoonotic influenza A), respiratory syncytial virus, parainfluenza viruses, rhinoviruses, adenoviruses, enteroviruses (e.g. EVD68), human metapneumovirus, and endemic human coronaviruses (i.e. HKU1, OC43, NL63, and 229E). LRT specimens can also be tested for bacterial pathogens, including Legionella pneumophila.

In hospitalized patients with confirmed nCoV infection, repeat URT and LRT samples should be collected to demonstrate viral clearance. The frequency of specimen collection will depend on local circumstances but should be at least every 2 to 4 days until there are two consecutive negative results (both URT and LRT samples if both are collected) in a clinically recovered patient at least 24 hours apart. If local infection control practice requires two negative results before removal of droplet precautions, specimens may be collected as often as daily.

E. Management of hypoxemic respiratory failure and ARDS

Recognize severe hypoxemic respiratory failure when a patient with respiratory distress is failing standard oxygen therapy. Patients may continue to have increased work of breathing or hypoxemia even when oxygen is delivered via a face mask with reservoir bag (flow rates of 10-15 L/min, which is typically the minimum flow required to maintain bag inflation; FiO₂ 0.60-0.95). Hypoxemic respiratory failure in ARDS commonly results from intrapulmonary ventilation-perfusion mismatch or shunt and usually requires mechanical ventilation.

High-flow nasal oxygen (HFNO) or non-invasive ventilation (NIV) should only be used in selected patients with hypoxemic respiratory failure. The risk of treatment failure is high in patients with MERS treated with NIV, and patients treated with either HFNO or NIV should be closely monitored for clinical deterioration. HFNO systems can deliver 60 L/min of gas flow and FiO₂ up to 1.0; paediatric circuits generally only handle up to 15 L/min, and many children will require an adult circuit to deliver adequate flow. Compared to standard oxygen therapy, HFNO reduces the need for intubation. Patients with hypercapnia (exacerbation of obstructive lung disease, cardiogenic pulmonary oedema), hemodynamic instability, multi-organ failure, or abnormal mental status should generally not receive HFNO, although emerging data suggest that HFNO may be safe in patients with mild-moderate and non-worsening hypercapnia.25 Patients receiving HFNO should be in a monitored setting and cared for by experienced personnel capable of endotracheal intubation in case the patient acutely deteriorates or does not improve after a short trial (about 1 hr). Evidence-based guidelines on HFNO do not exist, and reports on HFNO in MERS patients are limited.
NIV guidelines make no recommendation on use in hypoxemic respiratory failure (apart from cardiogenic pulmonary oedema and post-operative respiratory failure) or pandemic viral illness (referring to studies of SARS and pandemic influenza). Risks include delayed intubation, large tidal volumes, and injurious transpulmonary pressures. Limited data suggest a high failure rate when MERS patients receive NIV. Patients receiving a trial of NIV should be in a monitored setting and cared for by experienced personnel capable of endotracheal intubation in case the patient acutely deteriorates or does not improve after a short trial (about 1 hr). Patients with hemodynamic instability, multiorgan failure, or abnormal mental status should not receive NIV.

Recent publications suggest that newer HFNO and NIV systems with good interface fitting do not create widespread dispersion of exhaled air and therefore should be associated with low risk of airborne transmission.

Endotracheal intubation should be performed by a trained and experienced provider using airborne precautions. Patients with ARDS, especially young children or those who are obese or pregnant, may desaturate quickly during intubation. Pre-oxygenate with 100% FiO₂ for 5 minutes, via a face mask with reservoir bag, bag-valve mask, HFNO, or NIV. Rapid sequence intubation is appropriate after an airway assessment that identifies no signs of difficult intubation.

Implement mechanical ventilation using lower tidal volumes (4–8 ml/kg predicted body weight, PBW) and lower inspiratory pressures (plateau pressure <30 cmH₂O). This is a strong recommendation from a clinical guideline for patients with ARDS, and is suggested for patients with sepsis-induced respiratory failure who do not meet ARDS criteria. The initial tidal volume is 6 ml/kg PBW; tidal volume up to 8 ml/kg PBW is allowed if undesirable side effects occur (e.g. dyssynchrony, pH <7.15). Hypercapnia is permitted if meeting the pH goal of 7.30-7.45. Ventilator protocols are available. The use of deep sedation may be required to control respiratory drive and achieve tidal volume targets. Although high driving pressure (plateau pressure–PEEP) may more accurately predict increased mortality in ARDS compared to high tidal volume or plateau pressure, RCTs of ventilation strategies that target driving pressure are not currently available.

In patients with severe ARDS, prone ventilation for >12 hours per day is recommended. Application of prone ventilation is strongly recommended for adult and paediatric patients with severe ARDS but requires sufficient human resources and expertise to be performed safely.

Use a conservative fluid management strategy for ARDS patients without tissue hypoperfusion.

In patients with moderate or severe ARDS, higher PEEP instead of lower PEEP is suggested. PEEP titration requires consideration of benefits (reducing atelectrauma and improving alveolar recruitment) vs. risks (end-inspiratory overdistension leading to lung injury and higher pulmonary vascular resistance). Tables are available to guide PEEP titration based on the FiO₂ required to maintain SpO₂.

A related intervention of recruitment manoeuvres (RMs) is delivered as episodic periods of high continuous positive airway pressure [30–40 cm H₂O], progressive incremental increases in PEEP with constant driving pressure, or high driving pressure; considerations of benefits vs. risks are similar. Higher PEEP and RMs were both conditionally recommended in a clinical practice guideline. For PEEP, the guideline considered an individual patient data meta-analysis of 3 RCTs. However, a subsequent RCT of high PEEP and prolonged high-pressure RMs showed harm, suggesting that the protocol in this RCT should be avoided. Monitoring of patients to identify those who respond to the
initial application of higher PEEP or a different RM protocol, and stopping these interventions in non-responders, is suggested.

In patients with moderate-severe ARDS (PaO₂/FiO₂ <150), neuromuscular blockade by continuous infusion should not be routinely used. One trial found that this strategy improved survival in patients with severe ARDS (PaO₂/FiO₂ <150) without causing significant weakness, but results of a recent larger trial found that use of neuromuscular blockage with high PEEP strategy was not associated with survival when compared to a light sedation strategy without neuromuscular blockade. Continuous neuromuscular blockade may still be considered in patients with ARDS in certain situations: ventilator dyssnchony despite sedation, such that tidal volume limitation cannot be reliably achieved; or refractory hypoxemia or hypercapnia.

In settings with access to expertise in extracorporeal life support (ECLS), consider referral of patients with refractory hypoxemia despite lung protective ventilation. A recent guideline made no recommendation about ECLS in patients with ARDS. Since then, an RCT of ECLS for patients with ARDS was stopped early and found no statistically significant difference in the primary outcome of 60-day mortality between ECLS and standard medical management (including prone positioning and neuromuscular blockade). However, ECLS was associated with a reduced risk of the composite outcome of mortality and crossover to ECLS, and a post hoc Bayesian analysis of this RCT showed that ECLS is very likely to reduce mortality across a range of prior assumptions. In patients with MERS-CoV infection, ECLS vs. conventional treatment was associated with reduced mortality in a cohort study. ECLS should only be offered in expert centres with a sufficient case volume to maintain expertise and that can apply the IPC measures required for nCoV patients.

Avoid disconnecting the patient from the ventilator, which results in loss of PEEP and atelectasis. Use in-line catheters for airway suctioning and clamp endotracheal tube when disconnection is required (for example, transfer to a transport ventilator).

**F. Management of septic shock**

Recognize septic shock in adults when infection is suspected or confirmed AND vasopressors are needed to maintain mean arterial pressure (MAP) ≥65 mmHg AND lactate is ≥2 mmol/L, in absence of hypovolemia. Recognize septic shock in children with any hypotension (systolic blood pressure [SBP] <5th centile or >2 SD below normal for age) or 2-3 of the following: altered mental state; tachycardia or bradycardia (HR <90 bpm or >160 bpm in infants and HR <70 bpm or >150 bpm in children); prolonged capillary refill (>2 sec) or warm vasodilation with bounding pulses; tachypnea; mottled skin or petechial or purpuric rash; increased lactate; oliguria; hyperthermia or hypothermia.

In the absence of a lactate measurement, use MAP and clinical signs of perfusion to define shock. Standard care includes early recognition and the following treatments within 1 hour of recognition: antimicrobial therapy and fluid loading and vasopressors for hypotension. The use of central venous and arterial catheters should be based on resource availability and individual patient needs. Detailed guidelines are available for the management of septic shock in adults and children.

In resuscitation from septic shock in adults, give at least 30 ml/kg of isotonic crystalloid in adults in the first 3 hours. In resuscitation from septic shock in children in well-resourced settings, give 20 ml/kg as a rapid bolus and up to 40-60 ml/kg in the first 1 hr.
Do not use hypotonic crystalloids, starches, or gelatins for resuscitation.

Fluid resuscitation may lead to volume overload, including respiratory failure. If there is no response to fluid loading and signs of volume overload appear (for example, jugular venous distension, crackles on lung auscultation, pulmonary oedema on imaging, or hepatomegaly in children), then reduce or discontinue fluid administration. This step is particularly important where mechanical ventilation is not available. Alternate fluid regimens are suggested when caring for children in resource-limited settings.

Crystalloids include normal saline and Ringer’s lactate. Determine need for additional fluid boluses (250-1000 ml in adults or 10-20 ml/kg in children) based on clinical response and improvement of perfusion targets. Perfusion targets include MAP (>65 mmHg or age-appropriate targets in children), urine output (>0.5 ml/kg/hr in adults, 1 ml/kg/hr in children), and improvement of skin mottling, capillary refill, level of consciousness, and lactate. Consider dynamic indices of volume responsiveness to guide volume administration beyond initial resuscitation based on local resources and experience. These indices include passive leg raises, fluid challenges with serial stroke volume measurements, or variations in systolic pressure, pulse pressure, inferior vena cava size, or stroke volume in response to changes in intrathoracic pressure during mechanical ventilation.

Starches are associated with an increased risk of death and acute kidney injury vs. crystalloids. The effects of gelatins are less clear, but they are more expensive than crystalloids. Hypotonic (vs. isotonic) solutions are less effective at increasing intravascular volume. Surviving Sepsis also suggests albumin for resuscitation when patients require substantial amounts of crystalloids, but this conditional recommendation is based on low-quality evidence.

Administer vasopressors when shock persists during or after fluid resuscitation. The initial blood pressure target is MAP ≥ 65 mmHg in adults and age-appropriate targets in children.

If central venous catheters are not available, vasopressors can be given through a peripheral IV, but use a large vein and closely monitor for signs of extravasation and local tissue necrosis. If extravasation occurs, stop infusion. Vasopressors can also be administered through intraosseous needles.

If signs of poor perfusion and cardiac dysfunction persist despite achieving MAP target with fluids and vasopressors, consider an inotrope such as dobutamine

Vasopressors (i.e. norepinephrine, epinephrine, vasopressin, and dopamine) are most safely given through a central venous catheter at a strictly controlled rate, but it is also possible to safely administer them via peripheral vein and intraosseous needle. Monitor blood pressure frequently and titrate the vasopressor to the minimum dose necessary to maintain perfusion and prevent side effects. Norepinephrine is considered first-line in adult patients; epinephrine or vasopressin can be added to achieve the MAP target. Because of the risk of tachyarrhythmia, reserve dopamine for selected patients with low risk of tachyarrhythmia or those with bradycardia. In children with cold shock (more common), epinephrine is considered first-line, while norepinephrine is used in patients with warm shock (less common).
G. Prevention of complications

Implement the following interventions (Table 4) to prevent complications associated with critical illness. These interventions are based on Surviving Sepsis or other guidelines, and are generally limited to feasible recommendations based on high quality evidence.

Table 4: Prevention of complications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anticipated Outcome</th>
<th>Interventions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Reduce days of invasive mechanical ventilation | • Use weaning protocols that include daily assessment for readiness to breathe spontaneously  
• Minimize continuous or intermittent sedation, targeting specific titration endpoints (light sedation unless contraindicated) or with daily interruption of continuous sedative infusions |
| Reduce incidence of ventilator associated pneumonia | • Oral intubation is preferable to nasal intubation in adolescents and adults  
• Keep patient in semi-recumbent position (head of bed elevation 30-45°)  
• Use a closed suctioning system; periodically drain and discard condensate in tubing  
• Use a new ventilator circuit for each patient; once patient is ventilated, change circuit if it is soiled or damaged but not routinely  
• Change heat moisture exchanger when it malfunctions, when soiled, or every 5–7 days |
| Reduce incidence of venous thromboembolism       | • Use pharmacological prophylaxis (low molecular-weight heparin [preferred if available] or heparin 5000 units subcutaneously twice daily) in adolescents and adults without contraindications. For those with contraindications, use mechanical prophylaxis (intermittent pneumatic compression devices). |
| Reduce incidence of catheter related bloodstream infection | • Use a checklist with completion verified by a real-time observer as reminder of each step needed for sterile insertion and as a daily reminder to remove catheter if no longer needed |
| Reduce incidence of pressure ulcers              | • Turn patient every two hours |
| Reduce incidence of stress ulcers and gastrointestinal bleeding | • Give early enteral nutrition (within 24–48 hours of admission)  
• Administer histamine-2 receptor blockers or proton-pump inhibitors in patients with risk factors for GI bleeding. Risk factors for gastrointestinal bleeding include mechanical ventilation for ≥48 hours, coagulopathy, renal replacement  
• therapy, liver disease, multiple comorbidities, and higher organ failure score |
| Reduce incidence of ICU-related weakness         | • Actively mobilize the patient early in the course of illness when safe to do so |

H. Specific anti-Novel-CoV treatments and clinical research

There is no current evidence from RCTs to recommend any specific anti-nCoV treatment for patients with suspected or confirmed nCoV. Unlicensed treatments should be administered only in the context of ethically-approved clinical trials or the Monitored Emergency Use of Unregistered Interventions Framework (MEURI), with strict monitoring.

I. Special considerations for pregnant patients

Pregnant women with suspected or confirmed nCoV should be treated with supportive therapies as described above, taking into account the physiologic adaptations of pregnancy.

The use of investigational therapeutic agents outside of a research study should be guided by individual risk-benefit analysis based on potential benefit for mother and safety to fetus, with consultation from an obstetric specialist and ethics committee.

Emergency delivery and pregnancy termination decisions are challenging and based on many factors: gestational age, maternal condition, and fetal stability. Consultations with obstetric, neonatal, and intensive care specialists (depending on the condition of the mother) are essential.

Note: These guidelines are preliminary in nature and will be updated as soon as more information on clinical profile and treatment are available.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND FAMILY WELFARE

Detailed Guidelines for Infection Prevention Control for suspected cases of 2019-nCoV Acute Respiratory Disease

Clinical triage includes early recognition and immediate placement of patients in separate area from other patients (source control). Triaging Station-Offer mask, follow hand hygiene and respiratory etiquettes. Minimize the waiting time at triage station. A self-declaration form should be filled up for all suspected cases reporting to the hospital. All individuals, including family members, visitors and HCWs should apply standard, contact and droplet precautions. Place patients in adequately ventilated single rooms. When single rooms are not available, cohort patients suspected of 2019-nCoV acute respiratory disease together with minimum distance between two patients to be 1 meter.

IPC strategies to prevent or limit infection transmission in health-care settings include the following:

1. **Standard Precautions**
   1.1 Hand hygiene
   1.2 Respiratory hygiene
   1.3 Personal protective equipment (PPE)

2. **Additional Precautions**

3. **Bio Medical waste management**

4. **Laundry management**

5. **Sample collection, storage and transportation**

6. **Monitor health of HCWs providing care to cases of 2019-nCoV Acute Respiratory Disease**

7. **Hospital Disinfection (Environmental)**
1.1 Hand Hygiene

- Moments of Hand Hygiene

- Steps of Hand Hygiene

**Hand-washing technique with soap and water**

1. Wet hands with water
2. Apply enough soap to cover all hand surfaces
3. Rub hands palm to palm
4. Rub back of each hand with palm of other hand with fingers interlaced
5. Rub palm to palm with fingers interlaced
6. Rub with back of fingers to opposing palms with fingers interlaced
7. Rub each thumb clasped in opposite palm using a rotational movement
8. Rub tips of fingers in opposite palm in a circular motion
9. Rub each wrist with opposite hand
10. Rinse hands with water
11. Use elbow to turn off tap
12. Dry thoroughly with a single-use towel

Hand washing should take 15-30 seconds.
1.2 Respiratory Hygiene

- Offer a medical/surgical mask for suspected 2019-nCoV acute respiratory disease case for those who can tolerate it.
- Cover nose and mouth during coughing or sneezing with tissue or flexed elbow for others.
- Perform hand hygiene after contact with respiratory secretions.

1.3 Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

- PPE includes shoe cover, gown, mask, eye protection & gloves.
- Shoe cover should always be worn before entering the patient care area (Isolation ward etc.).
- If gowns are not fluid resistant, use a waterproof apron for procedures with expected high fluid volumes that might penetrate the gown.

**Donning & Doffing procedures should be diligently & carefully followed as given below.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEQUENCE FOR PUTTING ON PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The type of PPE used will vary based on the level of precautions required, such as standard and contact, droplet or airborne isolation precautions. The procedure for putting on and removing PPE should be tailored to the specific type of PPE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. GOWN</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Fully cover torso from neck to knees, arms to end of wrists, and arms around the back.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Fasten in back of neck and waist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. MASK OR RESPIRATOR</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Secure ties or elastic bands at middle of head and neck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Fit flexible band to nose bridge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Fit snug to face and below chin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Fit to leak protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. GOGGLES OR FACE SHIELD</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Place over face and eyes and adjust to fit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. GLOVES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Extend to cover wrist of isolation gowns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USE SAFE WORK PRACTICES TO PROTECT YOURSELF AND LIMIT THE SPREAD OF CONTAMINATION</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Keep hands away from face
- Limit surfaces touched
- Change gloves when torn or heavily contaminated
- Perform Hand Hygiene
PERFORM HAND HYGIENE BETWEEN STEPS IF HANDS BECOME CONTAMINATED AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER REMOVING ALL PPE
2. Additional precautions

- Cohort HCWs to exclusively care for cases to reduce the risk of spreading transmission.
- Place patient beds at least 1m apart;
- Perform procedures in an adequately ventilated room; i.e. at least natural ventilation with at least 160 l/s/patient air flow or negative pressure rooms with at least 12 air changes per hour (ACH) and controlled direction of air flow when using mechanical ventilation.
- Limit the number of persons present in the room to the absolute minimum required for the patient’s care and support.
- Use either single use disposable equipment or dedicated equipment (e.g. stethoscopes, blood pressure cuffs and thermometers). If equipment needs to be shared among patients, clean and disinfect between each patient use (e.g. ethyl alcohol 70%);
- Refrain from touching eyes, nose or mouth with potentially contaminated hands;
- Some aerosol generating procedures have been associated with increased risk of transmission of coronaviruses such as tracheal intubation, non-invasive ventilation, tracheotomy, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, manual ventilation before intubation and bronchoscopy. Ensure that HCWs performing aerosol-generating procedures use PPE with particulate respirator at least as protective as a NIOSH-certified N95, EU FFP2 or equivalent. When putting on a disposable particulate respirator, always perform the seal-check. Note that if the wearer has facial hair (beard) this can prevent a proper respirator fit.
- Avoid the movement and transport of patients out of the room or area unless medically necessary.
- Use designated portable X-ray equipment and/or other important diagnostic equipment.
- If transport is required, use pre-determined transport routes to minimize exposures to staff, other patients and visitors and apply medical mask to patient;
- Ensure that HCWs who are transporting patients wear appropriate PPE as described in this section and perform hand hygiene;
- Notify the receiving area of necessary precautions as soon as possible before the patient’s arrival;
• Routinely clean and disinfect patient-contact surfaces;
• Limit the number of HCWs, family members and visitors in contact with a patient with suspected 2019 nCoV- Acute Respiratory Disease;
• Maintain a record of all persons entering the patient's room including all staff and visitors.
• Duration of contact and droplet precautions for 2019 nCoV- Acute Respiratory Disease Standard precautions should always be applied at all times. Additional contact and droplet precautions should continue until the patient is asymptomatic.

3. Bio Medical Waste Management from suspected case of nCoV
   • All articles like swab, syringes, IV set, PPE etc are to be discarded in yellow bag.
   • All sharps like needle etc are to be collected in puncture proof container which should be discarded in yellow bag.

4. Laundry
   • All soiled clothing bedding and linen should be gathered without creating much motion / fluffing.
   • Do not shake sheets when removing them from the bed.
   • Always perform hand hygiene after handling soiled laundry items.
   • Laundry should be disinfected in freshly prepared 1% bleach and then transported to laundry in tightly sealed and labeled plastic bag.

5. Sample collection, storage and transportation
   • Collection and handling of laboratory specimens from patients with suspected 2019 nCoV- Acute Respiratory Disease. All specimens collected for laboratory investigations should be regarded as potentially infectious, and HCWs who collect, or transport clinical specimens should adhere rigorously to Standard Precautions to minimize the possibility of exposure to pathogens.
   • Ensure that HCWs who collect specimens use appropriate PPE (eye protection, medical mask, long-sleeved gown, gloves).
• If the specimen is collected under aerosol generating procedure, personnel should wear a particulate respirator at least as protective as a NIOSH-certified N95, EU FFP2 or equivalent
• Ensure that all personnel who transport specimens are trained in safe handling practices and spill decontamination procedures (As per Hospital Policy).

**Samples to be collected:**

• Nasopharyngeal swab / Nasal Swabs – 2
• Throat Swab

Before collecting the samples, it requires to be ensured that neck is in extended position. Nasopharyngeal swab will be collected with the per nasal swab provided in the kit, after taking out the swab it is passed along the floor of nasal cavity and left there for about five second and transferred into VTM and transported to the designated lab at 4 degree Celsius as soon as possible (same day).

• For collection of samples from throat area the other sterilized swab is swabbed over the tonsillar area and posterior pharyngeal wall and finally transferred into VTM and stored and transported to the designated lab at 4 degree Celsius as soon as possible (same day).

• Other respiratory material like endotracheal aspirated / broncheo-alveolar lavage in patients with more severe respiratory disease can also be collected and transported in the same way.

• Place specimens for transport in leak-proof specimen bags / Zip lock pouch (secondary container) with the patient’s label on the specimen container (primary container), and a clearly written laboratory request form.

• Ensure that health-care facility laboratories adhere to appropriate biosafety practices and transport requirements according to the type of organism being handled.

• Deliver all specimens by hand whenever possible.

• Document patients full name, age / date of birth of suspected 2019-nCoV case of potential concern clearly on the accompanying laboratory request form.

• Notify the laboratory as soon as possible that the specimen is being transported.
6. Monitor health of HCWs providing care to cases of 2019-nCoV Acute Respiratory Disease

HCWs and housekeeping staff providing care to cases of 2019-nCoV acute respiratory diseases cases shall be monitored daily for development of any symptoms as per the suspect case definition including charting of their temperature twice daily for 14 days after last exposure. If they develop any symptoms then standard protocol laid down for management of suspect case of 2019-nCoV acute respiratory disease shall be followed.

7. Hospital Disinfection (Environmental)

- Environmental surfaces or objects contaminated with blood, other body fluids, secretions or excretions should be cleaned and disinfected using standard hospital detergents/disinfectants e.g. freshly prepared 1% Sodium Hypochlorite or 5% Lysol. Spray the surface with 0.5% to 1% solution of Sodium Hypochlorite.
- The contact period of the chemical with the surface should be min. of 30 Minutes.
- Disinfect all external surfaces of specimen containers thoroughly (using an effective disinfectant) prior to transport. E.g. Sodium hypochlorite at 1%, 500 ppm available chlorine (i.e. 1:100 dilution of household bleach at initial concentration of 5%) or 5% Lysol
- Environmental surfaces or objects contaminated with blood, other body fluids, secretions or excretions should be cleaned and disinfected using standard hospital detergents/disinfectants e.g. freshly prepared 1% Sodium Hypochlorite or 5% Lysol
- Do not spray (i.e. fog) occupied or unoccupied clinical areas with disinfectant. This is a potentially dangerous practice that has no proven disease control benefit.
- Wear gloves, gown, mask and closed shoes (e.g. boots) when cleaning the environment and handling infectious waste. Cleaning heavily soiled surfaces (e.g. soiled with vomit or blood) increases the risk of splashes. On these occasions, facial protection should be worn in addition to gloves, gown and closed, resistant shoes. Wear gloves, gown, closed shoes and goggles/facial protection, when handling liquid infectious waste (e.g. any secretion or excretion
with visible blood even if it originated from a normally sterile body cavity). Avoid splashing when disposing of liquid infectious waste.

- Clean and disinfect mattress impermeable covers.
- Non-critical instruments /equipment (that are those in contact with intact skin and no contact with mucous membrane) require only intermediate or low level disinfection before and after use.

| Intermediate Level disinfectant: Alcohols, chlorine compounds, hydrogen Peroxide, chlorhexidine, |
| Low level disinfectants: Benzalkonium chloride, some soaps |

**LIQUID SPILL MANAGEMENT:**

- Promptly clean and decontaminate spills of blood and other potentially infectious materials.
- Wear protective gloves.
- Using a pair of forceps and gloves, carefully retrieve broken glass and sharps if any, and use a large amount of folded absorbent paper to collect small glass splinters. Place the broken items into the puncture proof sharps container.
- Cover spills of infected or potentially infected material on the floor with paper towel/ blotting paper/newspaper. Pour 0.5% freshly prepared sodium hypochlorite.
- Leave for 30 minutes for contact
- Place all soiled absorbent material and contaminated swabs into a designated waste container.
- Then clean the area with gauze or mop with water and detergent with gloved hands

**References**

- Infection Prevention Control Guidelines for suspected cases of Novel Coronavirus (nCoV) Atal Bihari Vajpayee Institute of Medical Sciences & Dr Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital, New Delhi-110001
- CDC guidelines on PPE https://www.cdc.gov/HAI/pdfs/ppe/PPEslides6-29-04.pdf
Title: Specimen Collection, Packaging and Transport Guidelines for 2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV)

Scope:
To be used by the Government health authorities/ hospitals/ clinicians/ laboratories planning to collect appropriate clinical samples as indicated for diagnosis of 2019-nCoV.

Purpose:
This document describes the information for collection, packaging and transport of clinical specimens to Influenza group at ICMR-National Institute of Virology (NIV), Pune, Maharashtra for diagnosis of 2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV).

Responsibilities:
• The clinician should decide necessity for collection of clinical specimens for laboratory testing of 2019-nCoV only after following the case definition as given by the health authorities, Government of India.
• Appropriate clinical sample need to be collected by laboratory personnel/ health care worker trained in specimen collection in presence of a clinician.
• By following all biosafety precautions and using personal protective equipment (PPEs), clinical samples need to be sent to the designated laboratory (ICMR-NIV, Pune) by following standard triple packaging.

Selection of patient:
Any person who presents with Severe Acute Respiratory Illness (SARI) AND any one of the following i.e. a history of travel from Wuhan, China in 14 days prior to symptoms onset; disease in healthcare worker working in an environment of SARI patients; unusual or unexpected clinical course, especially sudden deterioration despite appropriate treatment; should be urgently investigated. Updated case definition need to be followed as per MOHFW, Govt of India which is available on the website www.mohfw.gov.in

Specimen collection details:
(Adapted from the WHO guidelines on 2019-nCoV):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specimen type</th>
<th>Collection materials</th>
<th>Transport to laboratory</th>
<th>Storage till testing</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nasopharyngeal and oropharyngeal swab</td>
<td>Dacron or polyester flocked swabs*</td>
<td>4 °C</td>
<td>≤5 days: 4 °C &gt;5 days: 70 °C</td>
<td>The nasopharyngeal and oropharyngeal swabs should be placed in the same tube to increase the viral load.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronchoalveolar lavage</td>
<td>sterile container*</td>
<td>4 °C</td>
<td>≤48 hours: 4 °C &gt;48 hours: 70 °C</td>
<td>There may be some dilution of pathogen, but still a worthwhile specimen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tracheal aspirate, nasopharyngeal aspirate or nasal wash</td>
<td>sterile container*</td>
<td>4 °C</td>
<td>≤48 hours: 4 °C &gt;48 hours: 70 °C</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sputum</td>
<td>sterile container</td>
<td>4 °C</td>
<td>≤48 hours: 4 °C &gt;48 hours: 70 °C</td>
<td>Ensure the material is from the lower respiratory tract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tissue from biopsy or autopsy including from lung</td>
<td>sterile container with saline</td>
<td>4 °C</td>
<td>≤24 hours: 4 °C &gt;24 hours: 70 °C</td>
<td>Autopsy sample collection preferably to be avoided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serum (2 samples – acute and convalescent)</td>
<td>Serum separator tubes (adults: collect 3-5 ml whole blood)</td>
<td>4 °C</td>
<td>≤5 days: 4 °C &gt;5 days: 70 °C</td>
<td>Collect paired samples: • acute – first week of illness • convalescent – 2 to 3 weeks later</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For transport of samples for viral detection, use VTM (viral transport medium) containing antifungal and antibiotic supplements. Avoid repeated freezing and thawing of specimens.

Specimen labelling and processing:
• Personal protective equipment (apron, hand gloves, face shield, N95 Masks etc.) need to be used and all biosafety precautions should be followed so as to protect individuals and the environment.
• Proper labelling (name/age/gender/specimen ID) need to be done on specimen container and other details of sender (name/address/phone number) on the outer container by mentioning “To be tested for 2019-nCoV”
• For any queries, the nodal officer from ICMR-NIV Pune (Dr Yogesh K. Gurav, Scientist E) may be contacted (Phone 020-26006290/ 26006390; Email: gurav.yk@gmail.com/gurav.yk@gov.in) and need to be informed in advance before sending specimens to ICMR-NIV, Pune.
# Specimen Collection, Packaging and Transport Guidelines for 2019 novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV)

## Requirements for Clinical Samples Collection, Packaging and Transport

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Image</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Sample vials and Virus Transport Medium (VTM)</td>
<td><img src="VTM.jpg" alt="Image" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Adsorbent material (cotton, tissue paper), paraffin, seizer, cello tape</td>
<td><img src="Adsorbent.jpg" alt="Image" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. A leak-proof secondary container (e.g., ziplock pouch, cryobox, 50 mL centrifuge tube, plastic container)</td>
<td><img src="SecondaryContainer.jpg" alt="Image" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Hard-frozen Gel Packs</td>
<td><img src="GelPack.jpg" alt="Image" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. A suitable outer container (e.g., thermocol box, ice-box, hard-board box) (minimum dimensions: 10 x 10 x 10 cm)</td>
<td><img src="OuterContainer.jpg" alt="Image" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Procedure for Specimen Packaging and Transport

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Image</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Use PPE while handling specimen</td>
<td><img src="PPE.jpg" alt="Image" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Seal the neck of the sample vials using parafilm</td>
<td><img src="Seal.jpg" alt="Image" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Cover the sample vials using absorbent material</td>
<td><img src="Cover.jpg" alt="Image" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Arrange primary container (vial) in secondary container</td>
<td><img src="Arrange.jpg" alt="Image" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Placing the centrifuge tube inside a zip-lock pouch</td>
<td><img src="CentrifugeTube.jpg" alt="Image" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Placing the zip-lock pouch inside a sturdy plastic container and seal the neck of the container</td>
<td><img src="ZipLockPouch.jpg" alt="Image" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Note</strong>: Sample vials can also be placed inside a zip-lock pouch, covered in absorbent material and secured by heat-sealing or rubber bands. Then, the zip-lock pouch should be placed inside another plastic pouch and secured.</td>
<td><img src="Note.jpg" alt="Image" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Using a thermocol box as an outer container and placing the secondary container within it, surrounded by hard-frozen gel packs</td>
<td><img src="ThermocolBox.jpg" alt="Image" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Placing the completed Specimen Referral Form (available on <a href="http://www.niv.co.in">www.niv.co.in</a>) and request letter inside a leak-proof, zip-lock pouch</td>
<td><img src="SpecimenReferralForm.jpg" alt="Image" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Securing the zip-lock pouch with the Specimen Referral Form on the outer container</td>
<td><img src="Securing.jpg" alt="Image" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Attaching the labels: Senders' address, contact number; Consignee's address / contact number; Biological substance Category B; 'UN 3373'; Orientation label; Handle with care;</td>
<td><img src="Attaching.jpg" alt="Image" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Documents to accompany:
1) Packaging list/proforma invoice 2) Air way bill (for air transport) (to be prepared by sender or shipper) 3) Value equivalence document (for road/rail/sea transport) [Note: 1. A vaccine-carrier/ice-box can also be used as an outer container. 2. The minimum dimensions of the outer container should be 10 x 10 x 10 cm (length x width x height)]

## Routing of samples:
- Clinical specimens, official documents and Specimen request forms for testing of 2019-nCoV need to be sent to the ICMR-NIV address (The Director, ICMR-National Institute of Virology, 20-A, Dr Ambedkar Road, Pune, Maharashtra, Pin: 4110001).
- For shipment-related queries/information, kindly contact Dr Sumit Bharadwaj (Scientist B, Influenza Group) on email: sumitduttbhardwaj@gmail.com, phone 020-26006290/26006390
Title: Specimen Collection, Packaging and Transport Guidelines for 2019 nCoV - Acute Respiratory Disease

Scope: To be used by the treating physicians, public health experts and laboratory personnel from Government health authorities/hospitals/ planning to collect appropriate clinical samples as indicated for diagnosis of 2019 nCoV - Acute Respiratory Disease.

Purpose: Specimen collection, packaging and transport of clinical specimens to Influenza Lab in Division of Microbiology at National Centre for Disease control for diagnosis of 2019 nCoV - Acute Respiratory Disease.

Roles and Responsibilities:
- The clinicians with updated interim guidance on timely, effective, and safe supportive management of patients with 2019 nCoV - Acute Respiratory Disease should be well versed with suspected case definition from MOHFW https://mohfw.gov.in/sites/default/files/Guidelines%20on%20Clinical%20Management%20of%20Severe%20Acute%20Respiratory%20Illness.pdf
- The suspected case definition as given by the health authorities, Government of India must be followed.
- The appropriate clinical sample needs to be collected by health care worker trained in specimen collection in presence of a clinician.
- Samples should be collected with all biosafety precautions and should be accompanied with detailed history of patient on the proforma which can be obtained from the testing laboratory in standard triple packaging.
- Personal protective equipment (apron, hand gloves, face shield, N95 Masks etc.) need to be used and all biosafety precautions should be followed while carrying out sample collection and packaging.

Specimen collection, storage and transport details:
(Adapted from WHO guidelines 2019 nCoV - Acute Respiratory Disease)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specimen type</th>
<th>Collection materials</th>
<th>Transport laboratory (48-72 hrs)</th>
<th>Storage till testing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nasopharyngeal and oropharyngeal swab (Both swabs should be placed in the same tube to increase the viral load)</td>
<td>Dacron or polyester flocked swabs*</td>
<td>4 °C</td>
<td>≤72 hrs: 4 °C &gt;72 hrs: -70 °C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronchoalveolar lavage</td>
<td>Sterile container*</td>
<td>4 °C</td>
<td>≤48 hours: 4 °C &gt;48 hours: -70 °C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tracheal aspirate, nasopharyngeal aspirate or nasal wash</td>
<td>Sterile container*</td>
<td>4 °C</td>
<td>≤48 hours: 4 °C &gt;48 hours: -70 °C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sputum (Ensure the material is from the lower respiratory tract)</td>
<td>Sterile container</td>
<td>4 °C</td>
<td>≤48 hours: 4 °C &gt;48 hours: -70 °C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For transport of samples for viral detection, use VTM (viral transport medium). Avoid repeated freezing and thawing of specimens.

Specimen packaging and transport:

Sample should be safely packed in Triple container packing and should be transported under cold chain to the reference laboratory with prior intimation. The packaging consists of three layers as follows.
1. Primary receptacle: A labelled primary watertight, leak-proof receptacle containing the specimen. The receptacle is wrapped in enough absorbent material to absorb all fluid in case of breakage.
2. Secondary receptacle: A second durable, watertight, leak-proof receptacle to enclose and protect the primary receptacle(s). Several wrapped primary receptacles may be placed in one secondary receptacle. Sufficient additional absorbent material must be used to cushion multiple primary receptacles.
3. Outer shipping package. The secondary receptacle is placed in an outer shipping package which protects it and its contents from outside influences such as physical damage and water while in transit.

Specimen data forms, letters and other types of information that identify or describe the specimen for “testing of 2019 nCoV - Acute Respiratory Disease “ and also identify the shipper and receiver should be taped to the outside of the secondary receptacle.